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REACHING BEYOND BANKS: HOW TO TARGET TRADE-BASED MONEY
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING OUTSIDE THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR*
Ross S. Delston† & Stephen C. Walls‡
Anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism 
(AML/CFT) measures have succeeded in restricting the two traditional ave-
nues of money laundering, namely, the abuse of financial intermediaries 
and the physical movement of money across borders. Consequently, interna-
tional criminal and terrorist organizations have turned to trade-based mon-
ey laundering (TBML) to conceal and legitimize their funds, as this is a 
channel that remains relatively untouched by AML/CFT efforts internation-
ally. This abuse of the global trade network has received increasing recog-
nition from the Financial Action Task Force, the international standard-
setter, as the next front in AML/CFT. Because TBML methods may be used 
not only to launder money, but also to finance international terrorism, to 
facilitate weapons proliferation, and to conceal and transport WMDs, this 
article proposes a far-reaching solution—that those in the international 
supply chain be required by law to adopt AML/CFT safeguards to protect 
their businesses, including filing suspicious activity reports, identifying 
their customers, and designating an AML/CFT compliance officer.  
I. INTRODUCTION
The international fight against money laundering began in the 
1960s, but with the signing of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
 *  Portions of this article are based in part on Ross Delston’s earlier article entitled The 
41st FATF Recommendation: Why preventive measures targeting trade-based money laun-
dering should reach beyond banks, MONEY LAUNDERING BULLETIN (March 2008), at 8, re-
printed as The 41st FATF Recommendation: Why banks alone cannot prevent trade-based 
money laundering, ACAMS TODAY, (July/Aug. 2008), at 42. 
 †  Ross S. Delston (J.D. with honors, The George Washington University Law School, 
1976), CAMS (Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist) is a Washington, DC lawyer 
and the founder of GlobalAML.com, a consulting firm specializing in anti-money laundering 
compliance. Former positions include Consulting Counsel, AML/CFT Unit, International 
Monetary Fund (2000–05), Counsel and Assistant General Counsel—Assisted Acquisitions, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1986–91), and Counsel, Export-Import Bank of the 
U.S (1976–86). 
 ‡  Stephen C. Walls (J.D. with honors, The George Washington University Law School, 
2008) will be a R. Michael Gadbaw Fellow on the International Law & Policy Team of the 
General Electric Company in Washington D.C. during 2009.
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Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in December 1988,1
efforts to target money laundering became a major international focus. 
Since its inception in 1990,2 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an 
intergovernmental organization formed to help countries combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing, has focused considerable attention on the 
role of financial institutions, and, more recently,3 the physical movement of 
money across borders.4 The fight against money laundering and internation-
al terrorism in recent years has highlighted a third method by which illicit 
funds may be transferred across borders: abuse of the international trade 
system.5 The FATF has signaled its interest in Trade-Based Money Laun-
dering (TBML) by its publication of a report entitled “Trade Based Money 
Laundering” (TBML Report) in June 2006.6 Subsequently, in June 2008, the 
FATF issued its “Best Practices Paper on Trade Based Money Laundering” 
(FATF Best Practices Paper), providing more detail about TBML and how 
to prevent it.7
The TBML Report and the Best Practices Paper (collectively, the 
FATF Reports) identify TBML as one of the three main avenues of money 
laundering,8 and define TBML as the process of legitimizing the proceeds 
of crime by moving value through trade transactions to disguise their illicit 
origins.9 The FATF Reports describe several examples of TBML that have 
occurred in the laundering of drug profits and terrorist financing.10
 1 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 165, 170, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/conventio
n_1988_en.pdf [hereinafter The 1988 Vienna Convention]. According to the U.N. Office on 
Drugs and Crime, the Vienna Convention is “the first international convention which crimi-
nalises [sic] money-laundering.” U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, U.N. Instruments and 
Other Relevant International Standards on Money-Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/Instruments-Standards.html (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2009).  
2 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 1.  
3 Special Recommendation IX on cash couriers was adopted by the Financial Action Task 
Force in October 2004. See Press Release, FATF, FATF Targets Cross-Border Cash Move-
ments by Terrorists and Criminals, (Oct. 22, 2004), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/8/5/34301987.pdf.
4 Financial Action Task Force, Trade Based Money Laundering at i (June 23, 2006), 




7 Financial Action Task Force, Best Practices Paper on Trade Based Money Laundering
(June 20, 2008), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/9/28/40936081.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Best Practices Paper]. 
8 Id. at 1. See also Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 1.
9 Best Practices Paper, supra note 7, at 1–2. See also Trade Based Money Laundering,
supra note 4, at 3. The other two definitions of TBML are the use of the financial system and 
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TBML can be accomplished in a variety of ways and commonly oc-
curs through the deliberate misrepresentation of the price, quantity, or quali-
ty of traded goods.11 TBML techniques display a wide range of complexity, 
from simple fraudulent invoicing to the sophisticated integration of the trade 
in goods into complicated financial transactions that obscure the source of 
funds.12
With the more traditional avenues of money laundering being in-
creasingly scrutinized, criminals attempting to hide the proceeds of their 
crimes are turning to other methods of money laundering, including activity 
in real estate as well as TBML.13 The stakes are rising as well—TBML may 
involve not only predicate crimes,14 such as narcotics trafficking, human 
trafficking and terrorist financing, but may also disguise the logistical sup-
port for terrorist activities, such as the movement of weapons of mass de-
struction and the materials used to make them.15
Each year, more than twenty million containers enter the U.S. by 
sea, rail and truck, from foreign countries, including those with porous law 
enforcement and regulatory regimes.16 Of those twenty million containers 
entering the U.S. annually, fewer than five percent are physically in-
                                                     
the physical movement of money across international borders (e.g., through the use of cash 
couriers). Id. at i. 
10 See Best Practices Paper, supra note 7, at 1; Trade Based Money Laundering, supra
note 4, at 13–15.  
11 Best Practices Paper, supra note 7, at 1; Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, 
at 3–4. 
12 Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 25. 
13 See, e.g., NORMA J. WILLIAMS, 2007 UPDATE ON THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13224 61–62 (Williams & Associates 2007) (noting that the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has found property manage-
ment, real estate investment, real estate brokerage, and real estate development companies 
the most commonly reported entities involved with money laundering). See also Elizabeth A. 
Cheney, Leaving No Loopholes for Terrorist Financing: The Implementation of the USA 
PATRIOT Act in the Real Estate Field, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1721 (2005); Trade Based 
Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 1 (“Not surprisingly, research has shown that when 
governments take action against certain methods of money laundering or terrorist financing, 
criminal activities tend to migrate to other methods.”). 
14 Under U.S. law, the underlying crimes to the offense of money laundering are called 
“specified unlawful activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2000). 
15 See The Wolfsberg Group, The Wolfsberg Trade Finance Principles 1, 5–6 (Jan. 14, 
2009), available at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com. See also Oxford Analytica, Ship 
Containers, Potentially Used by Terrorists, May Get More Screening, THE HILL, Dec. 4, 
2007, http://thehill.com/op-eds/ship-containers-potentially-used-by-terrorists-may-get-more-
screening-2007-12-04.html.
16 See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL, CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE 2006–2011
STRATEGIC PLAN 6 (2006), available at http://cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo_securi 
ty/csi/csi_strategic_plan.ctt/csi_strategic_plan.pdf [hereinafter CONTAINER SECURITY 
INITIATIVE].
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spected.17 Consequently, this is not just a matter of combating money laun-
dering and terrorist financing, but also of combating terrorism itself and the 
threats it poses to our national security. 
Whether the FATF will add a forty-first Recommendation to its cur-
rent 40 (40 Recommendations)18 or a tenth Recommendation to the 9 Spe-
cial Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (9 Special Recommendations; 
collectively the 40+9 Recommendations),19 has yet to be announced.20
Moreover, what an additional Recommendation might look like is also un-
known. But in order for any new Recommendation to be effective, the 
FATF needs to go further than it has in the past. 
Any new Recommendation on TBML should encompass not only 
the financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and pro-
fessions (DNFBP) currently addressed in the 40+9 Recommendations,21 but 
also all those involved in the international trade supply chain. This includes 
importers and exporters, freight forwarders, shippers, and air couriers—
companies referred to as “traders” in the Best Practices Paper.22 And be-
cause most of the largest multinational industrial companies also fall within 
the definition of “traders,” an effective TBML proposal would need to en-
compass a whole new category of non-financial companies that currently 
may not be paying close attention to the AML/CFT safeguards embodied in 
the 40+9 Recommendations. 
17 See Susan E. Martonosi, David S. Ortiz, Henry H. Willis, Evaluating the Viability of 
100 percent container inspection at America’s Ports, in THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF 
TERRORIST ATTACKS 218, 221–222 Harry W. Richardson et al. eds., 2007) (citing the five 
percent figure). 
18 Financial Action Task Force, The Forty Recommendations (June 20, 2003 & Supp. Oct. 
22, 2004), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.PDF [hereinafter 
Forty Recommendations].
19 Financial Action Task Force, Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (Oct.
22, 2004), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf [hereinafter 9
Special Recommendations]. 
20 The 40 Recommendations are individually identified through the use of Arabic numer-
als (e.g., 1, 2, 3), while the Special 9 Recommendations by Roman numerals (e.g., I, II, III). 
21 Designated non-financial businesses and professions cover five categories of businesses 
and professionals: lawyers, notaries and accountants when engaged in commercial transac-
tions for clients; dealers in precious metals and precious stones; gambling casinos; real estate 
agents; and company and trust service providers when engaged in a range of services. Forty
Recommendations, supra note 18, at 6–8; Financial Action Task Force, 40 Recommendations 
Glossary, http://www.fatfgafi.org/glossary/0,3414,en_32250379_32236889_35433764_1_1_ 
1_1,00.html (last visited Fed. 1, 2009). 
22 Best Practices Paper, supra note 7, at 2 (“The term trader refers to anyone who facili-
tates the exchange of goods and related services across national borders, international boun-
daries or territories. This would also include a corporation or other business unit organized 
and operated principally for the purpose of importing or exporting goods and services (e.g. 
import/export companies).”).  
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If adopted, a new Recommendation should require governments to 
ensure, among other things, that traders adopt a customer identification pro-
gram, conduct customer due diligence, increase the scope and quality of 
record keeping, and file suspicious activity reports or suspicious transaction 
reports, just as financial institutions and DNFBP must do under current 
AML/CFT standards. In the United States, this would include the four pil-
lars of an AML program under Section 352 of the Uniting and Strengthen-
ing America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Ob-
struct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act): (1) internal policies, proce-
dures, and controls; (2) designation of an AML compliance officer; (3) on-
going employee training; and (4) an independent audit function to test the 
AML program.23
In order to demonstrate that a TBML Recommendation that impos-
es new obligations on traders should be added to the 40+9 Recommenda-
tions, this article will first highlight the ability of soft law to generate effec-
tive coordination in banking and financial issues. From there, the focus will 
shift to the FATF Recommendations in order to show that the object and 
purpose of the FATF24 encompasses efforts to stop TBML. Finally, this 
article will discuss compliance programs designed to reduce liability for 
TBML, both under existing AML/CFT laws and regulations, as well as un-
der a new FATF Recommendation or other international action on TBML. 
II. THE USE OF SOFT LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE TO COORDINATE 
FINANCE AND BANKING REGULATION
International efforts to coordinate finance and banking regulation 
rely overwhelmingly on the use of soft law to generate common policies.25
The use of lex ferenda, as opposed to lex lata,26 serves several important 
functions in achieving the desired result of international coordination. 
Among these functions are speed, flexibility, and simplicity.27
23 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub, L. No. 107-57, § 352, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2001)). 
24 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 8. I.L.M. 679 
(stating that a treaty is to be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms 
of the treaty in light of its object and purpose). 
25 See generally, Martin Marcussen, OECD Governance Through Soft Law, in SOFT LAW 
IN GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION 103, 110 (Ulrika Mörth, ed., 2004) (noting the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development’s six-to-one preference for soft law in-
struments).
26 The “law as it should be,” as opposed to the “law as it exists.” 
27 See Charles Lipson, Why Are Some Agreements Informal? 45 INT’L ORG. 495, 501 
(1991) (discussing how the benefits of choosing informal agreements include avoiding for-
mal pledges, avoiding ratification, being able to modify as circumstances change, and being 
able to reach agreements quickly). 
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Because soft law contains neither explicit remedies nor binding en-
forcement mechanisms,28 in areas of common concern, soft law can be more 
quickly and easily developed than agreements that impose specific sanctions 
for violations of particular provisions.29 Furthermore, the lack of explicit 
remedies or enforcement mechanisms makes soft law particularly well-
suited to generate common policies in areas of complex national regulation 
or new and emerging issues.30
For new and emerging issues such as money laundering,31 the lack 
of specific sanctions in soft law can be an asset.32 Because soft law avoids 
recourse to litigation over non-compliance, the language and content of soft 
law provisions do not require the same degree of consensus as hard law;33 in 
other words, crafting soft law permits a degree of speed and flexibility un-
usual for internationally enforceable agreements such as the 1988 Vienna 
Convention. As a result, soft law allows states to address new and emerging 
issues while “provid[ing] an opportunity for experience and experiment,” 
which in turn encourages the flow of information among the parties in order 
to better address the issue and coordinate in the future.34
For issues that already receive national treatment in virtually every 
country, such as the basic elements of bank regulatory law, both the public 
and private sectors understandably are reluctant to add another layer of spe-
cifically enforceable measures onto an already burdensome and often by-
zantine system of regulation.35 By relying on soft law to set international 
standards for national efforts, the overall aim can be achieved, e.g., the cri-
minalization of money laundering, while the methods by which this goal is 
28 JOSEPH GOLD, INTERPRETATION: THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (1996) (“Soft 
law expresses a preference and not an obligation that states should act, or should refrain from 
acting, in a specified manner. The underlying assumption is that behavior, or forbearance 
from behavior, in accordance with this preference will be directly beneficial to states.”). 
29 See Lipson, supra note 27, at 501 (discussing the benefits of using informal agree-
ments). 
30 See Dinah Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of ‘Soft Law,’ in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 13, 
14 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). 
31 The 40 Recommendations were first issued in 1990. Forty Recommendations, supra
note 18, at i. 
32 David A. Wirth, Compliance with Non-Binding Norms of Trade and Finance, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM 330, 330 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (“[A] non-binding ‘soft’ instrument can 
allow [states] to gain experience with more ambitious, aspirational goals in a less risky mi-
lieu.”). 
33 GOLD, supra note 28, at 301 (“In other instances, soft law is all that can be achieved 
because adequate experience to support firm law is thought to be missing.”). 
34 Shelton, supra note 30, at 15. 
35 Id. at 14. 
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accomplished remain open. As such, “compliance may be improved by in-
creasing opportunities to engage in desirable behavior.”36
Furthermore, soft law can increase the involvement of non-state ac-
tors.37 “In the area of trade and finance, where the private sector predomi-
nates and is the primary target of norms, non-binding instruments, despite 
their non-binding character, become appealing vehicles through which 
states can establish expectations.”38
Consequently, for an issue such as TBML, which involves both 
trade and finance and needs to involve a variety of non-state actors, the 
FATF 40+9 Recommendations can take advantage of the flexibility and 
range found in soft law instruments to great effect. And although a soft law 
instrument would preclude certain enforcement efforts that hard law would 
allow, soft law has been the vehicle of choice in international banking law 
and has been employed with increasing effect over the last thirty years.39
A. International Banking Law: The Utility of Soft Law 
Because banks take deposits from the public and are universally 
subject to a plethora of rules generated by their regulators,40 banking issues 
are well suited to soft law in the international sphere. 
Despite the non-binding nature of soft law, it “is entered into with 
the expectation shared by all parties that they will observe it.”41 The interna-
tional standards concerning banking from the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS)42 provide a clear example of this expectation of compliance. 
As a leading actor in international banking standards, the BIS and 
its Committees, particularly the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
operate almost exclusively through soft law instruments. And although the 
36 Id. at 15. 
37 Wirth, supra note 32, at 331. 
38 Id.
39 See Michael P. Malloy, INTERNATIONAL BANKING 77 et seq. (2d ed., Carolina Acad. 
Press 2005). See also Part III.A.2, infra.
40 For example. in the U.S., there are five Federal banking regulators: the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve—which regulates state member banks and bank and financial 
holding companies, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency—which regulates national 
banks, the Office of Thrift Supervision—which regulates savings associations and savings 
and loan holding companies, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—which regulates 
state non-member banks, including industrial loan companies, and the National Credit Union 
Administration—which regulates Federal credit unions. State-chartered banks are additional-
ly regulated by authorities of the chartering state. 
41 GOLD, supra note 28, at 301–302.  
42 “The Bank for International Settlements is an international organization [headquartered 
in Basel, Switzerland, that] which fosters international Monetary and financial cooperation 
and serves as a bank for central banks.” About the Bank for International Settlements, 
http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm. (last visited, Feb. 2, 2009). 
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BIS does not have formal regulatory authority, the BIS’s Basel Capital Ac-
cord, for example, “is considered to be binding on the members and the 
agreement itself states that the Committee will continually monitor its ap-
plication.”43 As another example, the BIS’s 1992 Report on Minimum Stan-
dards for Capital Adequacy explicitly that states that it is non-binding,44 but 
also explicitly states that BIS participants are expected to implement the 
standards contained therein, and that BIS participants may undertake action 
to minimize the risks associated with noncompliance.45
The more recent BIS Accord, Basel II,46 has broadened the impact 
of BIS soft law. “More importantly, states have endorsed the specific prin-
ciples of the [Basel II] Accord as legally binding features of their national 
regulatory systems, and the states—and affected private sectors—have 
treated the development of Basel II as legally significant.”47 Many features 
of both the U.S. and European Union bank regulatory regimes reflect stan-
dards that match or exceed those issued by the BIS and its Committees.48
Furthermore, those financial authorities not adhering to BIS standards “risk 
being regarded by major international banks and their financial authorities, 
including BIS itself, as ‘unattractive’ business partners. And in this global 
economy they cannot afford to develop activities in isolation.”49
III. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS REGARDING ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: THE HARDEST KIND OF SOFT
LAW
When a new issue like AML/CFT emerges internationally, soft law 
facilitates the quick and coordinated effort needed to address the problem. 
Taking advantage of its flexibility and speed, soft law has been the major 
43 Peter C. Hayward, Prospects for International Cooperation by Bank Supervisors, 24 
INT'L LAW. 787, 790–91 (1990). 
44 See Michael P. Malloy, Emerging International Regime of Financial Services Regula-
tion, 18 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 329, 346 (2005). 
45 See id. (concluding that “[i]ndeed, in U.S. practice the fourth standard has been imple-
mented as a statutory expectation and requires that a non-U.S. based banking enterprise 
applying for entry will be subject to comprehensive supervision by its home state as a condi-
tion of entry into the U.S. market.”). 
46 Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Interna-
tional Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, A Revised Framework
(June 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf. 
47 Malloy, supra note 44, at 346. 
48 See Michael P. Malloy, INTERNATIONAL BANKING 77 et seq. (2d ed., Carolina Acad. 
Press 2005). 
49 Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, The Role for the Bank of International Settlements in 
Shaping the World Financial System, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 945, 991–92 (2004). 
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vehicle through which states have coordinated their AML/CFT efforts inter-
nationally.50
The leading international organization dedicated to setting standards 
in the field of AML/CFT is the FATF. Although now an independent organ-
ization with a finite but renewable mandate, the FATF was created at a 1989 
G-7 meeting under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development51 to address international money laundering 
undertaken by transnational organized crime groups.52
To this end, the FATF first issued its 40 Recommendations in 
1990,53 initially revised them in 1996,54 and then revised them again in 
2003.55 The 40 Recommendations demonstrate both the flexibility and ef-
fectiveness of soft law in generating international action on combating 
money laundering.56 With the October 2001 issuance of the 8 Special Rec-
ommendations on Terrorist Financing (now 9 Special Recommendations, 
50 Most international instruments on money laundering have a non-binding and flexible 
character. Id. But see U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 165, 170 [hereinafter the 1988 Vienna 
Convention]; U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Dec. 12, 2000, 2225 
U.N.T.S. 209, 277 [hereinafter Palermo Convention]. The 1988 Vienna Convention requires 
signatory nations to criminalize the laundering of drug money. The 1988 Vienna Convention, 
supra, art. 3. The Palermo Convention requires signatory nations to criminalize money laun-
dering for “the widest range of predicate offenses” and requires signatories to set up a “com-
prehensive” domestic regime to combat money laundering including customer identification 
and suspicious activity reporting. Palermo Convention, supra, arts. 6–7. See also Beth Sim-
mons, International Efforts Against Money Laundering, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE:
THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 244, 250–54 (Di-
nah Shelton ed., 2000) (noting that, at the time of publication in 2000, nine of the ten interna-
tional instruments combating money laundering are soft law, with the exception being the 
1988 Vienna Convention). 
51 The OECD headquarters in Paris, France houses the FATF secretariat. See Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Departments, Directories, Centres and 
Agencies, http://www.oecd.org/maindepartment/0,3350,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00. 
html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). 
52 Financial Action Task Force, FATF Revised Mandate (April 12, 2008), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/3/32/40433653.pdf [hereinafter Revised Mandate]. 
53 See Financial Action Task Force, The Forty Recommendations, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/28/0,3343,en_32250379_ 32236930_33658140_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2009). 
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Beth Simmons, International Efforts Against Money Laundering, in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 244, 
262 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (“The choice of a non-binding legal accord in the area of 
money laundering was a significant step toward harmonizing national rules to fight money 
laundering. . . . Guidelines in the form of recommendations permit countries to implement 
them according to their particular circumstances, in contrast to mandatory detailed obliga-
tions in a binding document.”). 
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collectively the 40+9 Recommendations)57 in the aftermath of the events of 
September 11, 2001, the FATF added a second set of standards, this time 
relating to CFT, in addition to its original standards on AML.
Consistent with OECD practice, the 40+9 Recommendations rely 
on information gathering, mutual monitoring, and “name and shame” sanc-
tions in order to accomplish its goals.58 Addressing both states and non-state 
actors, such as financial institutions and certain “gatekeepers”59 known as 
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBP), the 40+9 
Recommendations call upon states to, inter alia: (1) criminalize and penal-
ize money laundering and the financing of terrorism;60 (2) require customer 
due diligence and record keeping by financial institutions and DNFBP; 61 (3) 
require the reporting of suspicious transactions and other similar meas-
ures;62 (4) provide for sanctions against non-compliant states;63 (5) create 
and maintain competent authorities to prevent money laundering, including 
law enforcement; (6) supervise financial institutions and DNFBP;64 and (7) 
engage in greater international cooperation.65
57 Forty Recommendations, supra note 18, at i. Special Recommendation IX, on cash 
couriers, was added by the FATF in October 2004. See 9 Special Recommendations, supra
note 19, at 2. 
58 Michael Levi & Peter Reuter, Money Laundering, 34 CRIME & JUST. 289, 306 (2006). 
See also Martin Marcussen, OECD Governance Through Soft Law, in SOFT LAW IN 
GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION 103, 103 (Ulrika Mörth, ed., 2004) (quoting OECD leaders 
characterizing OECD efforts as a “continuing process of consultation” and “enforcement 
through peer pressure”).  
59 Designated non-financial businesses and professions were described earlier in this ar-
ticle. See supra note 21. See also Forty Recommendations, supra note 18, ¶¶ 16–24; Finan-
cial Action Task Force, Interpretative Notes to the 40 Recommendations of the FATF (Octo-
ber 22, 2003), http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/28/0,3343,en_32250379_32236920_33 
988956_1_1_1_1,00.html; Financial Action Task Force, 40 Recommendations Glossary,
http://www.fatfgafi.org/glossary/0,3414,en_32250379_32236889_35433764_1_1_1_1,00.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). 
60 Recommendations 1, through 3, 17, 38, 39 and Special Recommendations I–III and IX. 
Forty Recommendations, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
61 Recommendations 4–12 and 20. Id. at 2–5.  
62 Recommendations 13, 14, 16, 19, 20 and Special Recommendation IV. Id. at 5–7. 
63 Recommendation 21. Id. at 7–8.  
64 Recommendations 23–27, 29 – 31. Id. at 8–9. 
65 Recommendations 35–37, 40 and Special Recommendation V. Id. at 9–11. Several 
other sources are available to give an overview of the content of the 40 Recommendations. 
See, e.g., Herbert V. Morais, Fighting International Crime and its Financing: The Impor-
tance of Following a Coherent Strategy based on the Rule of Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 583, 
596–603 (2005).
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A. Compliance with the Financial Action Task Force’s Recommenda-
tions on Soft Law  
Despite the nonbinding nature of the 40+9 Recommendations,66 by 
the year 2000, all but one FATF member had undertaken efforts to facilitate 
mutual legal assistance for investigations,67 all but two FATF members re-
quired specific AML programs—including activity reporting,68 and nearly 
all FATF members had enacted measures for customer identification.69
Furthermore, the 40 Recommendations impacted states and private 
enterprise beyond the actual membership of the FATF.70 Starting in Febru-
ary 2000,  the FATF began publishing a series of reports identifying coun-
tries that failed to meet the 40 Recommendations and placed them on a list 
of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (the NCCT List). 71 The initial 
“name and shame” list contained fifteen jurisdictions.72 Between the publi-
cation of the first list in June 2000 and the removal in October 2006 of 
Myanmar, the last country on the list, all fifteen original jurisdictions had 
gone through a process of strengthening their legal and institutional frame-
works to avoid the stigma associated with membership on the NCCT List.73
Currently, no countries remain on the list.  
66 Beth Simmons, International Efforts Against Money Laundering, in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 244, 
245 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). 
67 Id. at 257. 
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 A list of member states is available online. Financial Action Task Force, FATF Mem-
bers and Observers, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/52/0,3343,en_32250379_32237295 
_34027188_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).  
71 See FATF press release, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/58/52/357182 
02.pdf.
72 The original fifteen countries were: Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, 
Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, the 
Russian Federation, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. See Press Re-
lease, FATF, 1999–2000 Report Released (June 22, 2000), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/58/28/35717473.pdf. 
73 Financial Action Task Force, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and Terri-
tories 2006–2007: Eighth NCCT Review, at 13 (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/14/11/39552632.pdf. 
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1.   Current initiatives by Financial Action Task Force, FATF-Style 
Regional Bodies (FSRBs), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and the World Bank to promote compliance with the FATF Rec-
ommendations
Beginning in 1992, the FATF began a process of conducting period-
ic mutual evaluations of its members, circulating mutual evaluation reports 
to all FATF members and publishing executive summaries in the FATF 
annual report.74 That process became more formalized in October 2002, 
when the FATF, FSRBs, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
World Bank cooperated to draft what is now called the “Methodology for 
Assessing Compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the FATF 
9 Special Recommendations” (the Methodology).75 “[T]he Methodology is 
a key tool to assist assessors in . . . identifying the systems and mechanisms 
developed by countries with diverse legal, regulatory and financial frame-
works, in order to implement robust AML/CFT systems.”76 The Methodol-
ogy is currently used not only by the FATF and FSRBs in their mutual 
evaluations of members, but also by the IMF and World Bank in assess-
ments of their member countries, as well as of offshore financial centers 
often affiliated with FATF member countries.77
The goal of the evaluation/assessment process is to determine 
whether the AML/CFT framework is effective:  
An effective AML/CFT system requires an adequate legal and institutional 
framework, which should include: (i) laws that create money laundering 
(ML) and terrorist financing (FT) offences and provide for the freezing, 
seizing and confiscation of the proceeds of crime and terrorist funding; (ii) 
laws, regulations or in certain circumstances other enforceable means that 
impose the required obligations on financial institutions and designated 
non-financial businesses and professions; (iii) an appropriate institutional 
or administrative framework, and laws that provide competent authorities 
with the necessary duties, powers and sanctions; and (iv) laws and other 
measures that give a country the ability to provide the widest range of in-
74 Financial Action Task Force, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering An-
nual Report 1991–1992, at paras. 29–53 (June 25, 1992), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/31/19/34041197.pdf (France, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Australia 
were the first countries to undergo a mutual evaluation). 
75 Financial Action Task Force, Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF 40 
Recommendations and the FATF 9 Special Recommendations, at 1 (updated Feb. 2009), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/16/54/40339628.pdf.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 5. 
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ternational co-operation. It is also essential that the competent authorities 
ensure that the whole system is effectively implemented.78
The process by which the FATF and FSRB mutual evaluations and 
the IMF and World Bank assessments are prepared has had the practical 
effect of pressuring countries to adhere to the 40+9 Recommendations, 
principally through the publication of ratings of individual FATF Recom-
mendations that are part of every evaluation/assessment.79 While publica-
tion of the reports is voluntary, it is rare for a country to refuse to do so. As 
a result, ratings of the 40+9 Recommendations routinely become public, as
do recommendations for improvement of the country’s AML/CFT frame-
work.80 This creates both a mandate for change in each country as well as 
heightened scrutiny from FATF members, particularly the G-7, to adhere to 
FATF standards. 
2. Seychelles’ Economic Development Act: A brief case study 
The FATF’s response to the Economic Development Act of the 
Seychelles provides a clear case of the effectiveness of the FATF in achiev-
ing its goals through soft law. In 1995, the Seychelles, a small archipelago 
in the Indian Ocean, passed its Economic Development Act (EDA), which 
was ostensibly designed to attract investment into the islands.81 The EDA 
provided that any investor investing over $10,000,000 in certain projects on 
the islands would receive immunity for any violent or drug-related crimes in 
the Seychelles.82
Using the “name and shame” sanctions at its disposal,83 the FATF 
publicized the Seychelles law, and called upon its members to “closely scru-
78 Id. at 6. 
79 Recommendations 21 and 22 of the 40 Recommendations, provide sanctions based on a 
“name and shame” principle ranging from letters of warning to diplomatic missions and calls 
for action to its members. See Beth Simmons, International Efforts Against Money Launder-
ing, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 244, 255–58 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (calling FATF sanc-
tions “a graduated system of embarrassment through peer pressure”). 
80 See Financial Action Task Force, Publications, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417, 
en_32250379_32237235_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).  
81 Seychelles Abolishes EDA, ILS FIDUCIARIES NEWSLETTER, http://www.ils-
world.com/newsletter/archive/seychelles.shtml (last visited Dec. 21, 2008). 
82 Id. 
83 Under Recommendations 21 and 22, FATF sanctions compose a rely on the “name and 
shame” principle, with sanctions ranging from letters of warning to diplomatic missions and 
calls for action to its members.  See Beth Simmons, International Efforts Against Money 
Laundering, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 257 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (calling FATF sanctions “a 
graduated system of embarrassment through peer pressure”). 
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tinize” all activity with Seychelles, which is not a FATF member.84 On July 
25, 2000, the Seychelles legislature repealed the EDA,85and affirmed its 
commitment to the fight against money laundering.86 The FATF ceased the 
application of Recommendation 21 sanctions on October 11, 2000.87
B. Trade-Based Money Laundering: The Forty-first Recommendation 
or the Tenth Special Recommendation on Terrorist Financing? 
A new Recommendation on TBML would fit squarely within the 
FATF mandate.88 As transactions involving the more traditional avenues of 
money laundering are scrutinized, detected and monitored, criminals will 
move to alternate methods of laundering the profits of their crimes and fi-
nancing their organizations.89
84 See Beth Simmons, International Efforts Against Money Laundering, in COMMITMENT 
AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
244, 258–59 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). 
85 FATF Lifts Its Investment Warning About Investment Law in Seychelles, ORGANISATION 
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Oct. 11, 2000, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/60/35714451.pdf. 
86 Lisa Ugur, Seychelles Underlines Tough Stance on Money Laundering with New UN 
Treaty, TAX-NEWS.COM Dec. 14, 2000, http://www.tax-news.com/archive/story/Seychelles 
_Underlines_Tough _Stance_On_Money_ Laundering_With_New_UN_Treaty_xxxx1495. 
html.
87 FATF Lifts Its Investment Warning About Investment Law in Seychelles, ORGANISATION 
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Oct. 11, 2000, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/60/35714451.pdf.  
88 Revised Mandate, supra note 52, at 2 (“The FATF, since its establishment, has focused 
its work on three main activities: standard setting, ensuring effective compliance with the 
standards and identifying money laundering and[, since 2001,] terrorist financing threats. 
These activities will remain at the core of the FATF’s work for the remainder of this 
mandate. Going forward, the FATF will build on this work and respond to new and emerging 
threats, such as proliferation financing and vulnerabilities in new technologies which could 
destabilize the international financial system.”). 
89 Herbert V. Morais, Fighting International Crime and its Financing: The Importance of 
Following a Coherent Strategy based on the Rule of Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 583, 619 (2005) 
(“As legal measures and law enforcement efforts worldwide continue to tighten the noose 
around money launderers, terrorists and corrupt public officials, criminals have shown re-
markable determination and ingenuity in devising new methods and schemes to launder 
criminal proceeds or finance terrorist activities over and above the traditional laundering 
techniques using the formal banking system.”). See also Cheney, supra note 13; WILLIAMS,
supra note 13, at 61–62 (noting that the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network has found property management, real estate investment, real estate 
brokerage, and real estate development companies the most commonly reported entities 
involved with money laundering). See also Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 
1 (“Not surprisingly, research has shown that when governments take action against certain 
methods of money laundering or terrorist financing, criminal activities tend to migrate to 
other methods.”).
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With twenty million containers entering into the U.S. in 2005, a 
number expected to triple by 2020,90 and with less than five percent of those 
containers being physically inspected,91 the international trade system re-
mains an attractive avenue for those wishing to launder the proceeds of a 
crime or engage in the financing of terrorism.92 As noted by Stephen Flynn, 
former National Guard Commander and senior fellow at the Council on 
Foreign Relations, “[t]he bad guys know how open the system is. The good 
guys do not seem to have a real command on it here because we have not 
paid as much attention to this problem as we need to.”93
Through its monitoring of money laundering typologies, the FATF 
has identified international trade as one of the three major avenues for mon-
ey laundering and terrorist financing.94 Yet international trade has received 
relatively little attention over the life of the FATF. The other two avenues, 
abuse of the financial system and the physical movement of cash across 
international borders, already are well covered by the 40+9 Recommenda-
tions.95 But “[i]nherent vulnerabilities in the international trade system, in-
cluding the enormous volumes of trade flows, which obscures individual 
transactions, provide abundant opportunity for criminal organizations and 
terrorist groups to transfer value across borders.”96
Additionally, the FATF has recognized that the increasing scrutiny 
of the other two major avenues, financial instruments and cash smuggling, 
“may have the unintended effect of increasing the attractiveness of interna-
90 See CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE, supra note 16, at 12.
91 Susan Martonosi, David S. Ortiz & Henry H. Willis, Evaluating the Viability of 100 per 
cent container inspection at America’s Ports, in THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF TERRORIST
ATTACKS 218, 222 (Harry W. Richardson et al. eds., 2005). But see C.J. Karamargin, Kolbe: 
Real Ports Issue is Container Inspection, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, March 9, 2006, at A7 (citing a 
one percent figure); Peter J. Kaye, Keep an Eye on Your Supply Chain, 78 PENN. CPA J. 32 
(2007) (citing a two percent figure). Although the U.S. Customs and Border Protection main-
tains that one-hundred percent of all containers are “screened” prior to arrival, they define 
“screening” as a combination of actual physical inspection, x-ray or non-intrusive inspection, 
and intelligence analysis designed to identify high-risk shipments. U.S. CUSTOMS AND 
BORDER PROTECTION, PORT SECURITY (2006). 
92 For an argument that free trade zones can exacerbate this risk, see Heather A. Brown, 
CAMS, Free Trade Zones: Haven for Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing?,
ACAMS TODAY, Jan. 2009, at 10–12, available at http://www.acams.org/Members/Resou
rceCenter/ACAMSToday/2009_January.pdf. 
93 On the Waterfront, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES, Feb. 26, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2006/02/24/60minutes/main1344473.shtml (quoting interview of Stephen Flynn). 
94 Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 1. See also The Wolfsberg Group, The
Wolfsberg Trade Finance Principles 3 (Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://www.wolfsberg-
principles.com (listing general typologies, including over- and under-invoicing and ship-
ping).
95 Id.
96 Best Practices Paper, supra note 7, at 1. 
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tional trade system for money laundering and terrorist financing activi-
ties.”97
1. Fit as the 41st Recommendation 
The international fight against money laundering began with a focus 
on illegal narcotics.98 One of the first multilateral initiatives on the need to 
combat money laundering came from the BIS99 in December 1988, when it 
issued its soft law “Statement of Principles on the Prevention of the Crimi-
nal Use of the Banking System for the Purposes of Money Laundering” 
(BIS Principles).100 In the preamble, the BIS states that “the increasing in-
ternational dimension of organized criminal activity, notably in relation to 
the narcotics trade, has prompted collaborative initiatives at the internation-
al level.”101
Negotiated at the same time as the BIS Principles was the hard law 
Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances, which was opened for signature in December 1988, and
entered into force in November 1990.102 The 1988 Vienna Convention re-
quired all signatory countries to criminalize the laundering of drug prof-
its.103 Moreover, when the FATF issued its first annual report in 1990, it 
noted that the 1988 Vienna Convention’s creation by the G-7 was because 
“the drug problem ha[d] reached devastating proportions,” and the resolu-
tion creating it was passed “among other resolutions on drug issues.”104
97 Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 1. 
98 The first statutes defining money laundering crimes were enacted in the U.S. and came 
into existence with the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, which was part of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986. See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2000)). See also Beth 
Simmons, International Efforts Against Money Laundering, in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 244, 
246 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (“In 1986, the U.S. was the only country to have criminalized 
money laundering.”); Levi & Reuter, supra note 58, at 306 (“For the United States, this was 
an important front for the war on drugs.”). 
99 “The Bank for International Settlements is an international organization[, headquartered 
in Basel, Switzerland, that] fosters international Monetary and financial cooperation and 
serves as a bank for central banks.” About the Bank for International Settlements, 
http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
100 Bank for International Settlements, Statement of Principles on the Prevention of the 
Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purposes of Money Laundering, at 1 (December 
1988), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf. 
101 Id.
102 The 1988 Vienna Convention, supra note 50. 
103 Id. at 170. 
104 Financial Action Task Force, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Re-
port, at 3 (1990), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/20/16/33643019.pdf. 
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Indeed, of the twelve case studies provided, the TBML Report spe-
cifically identified four instances of TBML by transnational drug cartels.105
Additionally, the FATF acknowledges that “[t]he original 40 Recommenda-
tions were drawn up in 1990 as an initiative to combat the misuse of the 
financial system by persons laundering drug money.”106 As the latest FATF 
mandate requires it to “build upon [its previous] work and respond to new 
and emerging threats,” a 41st Recommendation on TBML would fit square-
ly within the FATF’s original object and purpose of responding to the threat 
of money laundering posed by the international trade in drugs, and also its 
current expanded mandate.107
2. Fit as the tenth Special Recommendation on combating the financ-
ing of terrorism 
On the other hand, a tenth Special Recommendation on TBML 
would fit well with the character of the 9 Special Recommendations.108
While the original 40 Recommendations address states, financial institu-
tions, and DNFBP,109 the 9 Special Recommendations address entities and 
organizations not previously covered by the FATF.110
Eight of the 9 Special Recommendations were adopted at an ex-
traordinary plenary meeting of the FATF held on October 29–30, 2001,111
following almost immediately on the heels of U.N. Security Council Reso-
lution 1373, which focused on cutting off the sources of funds for terror-
ists.112 Although the language of the 9 Special Recommendations mirrors 
that of the original 40 Recommendations, and the 9 Special Recommenda-
tions primarily address states, three of the Special Recommendations deal 
with alternative remittance systems,113 money remitters,114 and non-profit 
organizations.115 In October 2004, Special Recommendation IX, addressing 
105 Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 13–15, 19. 
106 Financial Action Task Force, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering An-
nexes 2002–2003, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/12/63/3432 
8318.pdf.
107 Revised Mandate, supra note 52, at 2. 
108 9 Special Recommendations, supra note 19. 
109 See Forty Recommendations, supra note 18, at 2–6. 
110 See 9 Special Recommendations, supra note 19, at 1–2. 
111 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,
2003 INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (2004), http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/n 
rcrpt/2003/vol2/html/29915.htm. 
112 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (September 28, 2001). 
113 Special Recommendation VI. 9 Special Recommendations, supra note 19. 
114 Special Recommendation VII. Id.
115 This is in Special Recommendation VIII. Id.
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cash couriers, was added to address a major avenue of terrorist financing 
and money laundering.116
With the identification of extensive vulnerabilities in the interna-
tional trade system to money laundering and terrorist financing, a tenth Spe-
cial Recommendation may not be far behind the other nine. In February 
2008, the FATF issued a report entitled “Terrorist Financing” (Terrorist 
Financing Report) that included a case study from Belgium that illustrated a 
real world example of TBML being used to support a terrorist organiza-
tion.117
In the case study, large amounts of dollars flowed into the Belgian 
account of a business enterprise, and Euros flowed out to “Individual A,” 
who resided in the Middle East.118 The large inflows were the proceeds 
from the sale of conflict diamonds that “Individual B” and “Individual A” 
had smuggled into Belgium, and authorities discovered that “Individual A” 
and “Individual B” intended this transaction to benefit a known terrorist 
organization.119
Other incidents in the Terrorist Financing Report center on the use 
of the international drug trade to benefit terrorist organizations.120 Case stu-
dies submitted by the U.S., the Netherlands, and Turkey describe how ter-
rorist organizations either control or derive substantial benefit from interna-
tional drug trafficking networks.121
What is most notable about these case studies is the striking similar-
ity among the money laundering and financing techniques of international 
drug cartels, terrorist organizations and other transnational criminal net-
works. The main difference is to whom the proceeds of the illegal activity 
are delivered. In one case, the benefits go to a Belgian diamond trader, and 
in another, the benefits accrue to an international terrorist organization. In-
deed, “the greatest risk” is that a company operating with integrity could, 
inadvertently and through the normal course of its business, be aiding “the 
proliferation of WMD.”122 These risks in the international trade system 
should be addressed by those most directly involved in it, because they are 
116 Financial Action Task Force, Detecting and Preventing the Cross Border Movement of 
Cash by Terrorists and Other Criminals: International Best Practices, at 2 (Feb. 12, 2005), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/50/63/34424128.pdf. 
117 Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing, at 23 (Feb. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf [hereinafter Terrorist Financing]. 
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 15–17. 
121 Id. at 16–17.  See also Sara A. Carter, Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into U.S.,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2009, at A1. 
122 The Wolfsberg Group, The Wolfsberg Trade Finance Principles 5 (Jan. 14, 2009), 
available at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com. 
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best situated to develop safeguards designed to prevent this abuse of the 
international trade system.
IV. MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF A TRADE-BASED MONEY
LAUNDERING RECOMMENDATION: RED FLAGS AND COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS
As its mandate was extended in 2004, the FATF acknowledged that 
much work remained in its counter-terrorist financing mission, and stated 
that a “stronger connection between the typologies exercises and the stan-
dard setting task of the FATF must be created.”123 Having recently identi-
fied TBML as one of three major avenues by which to launder proceeds of a 
crime, a new Recommendation on TBML would fit with either the character 
of the original 40 Recommendations or the 9 Special Recommendations on 
CFT.
Now that this risk is known and the extent of its dangers are becom-
ing apparent, the threat of TBML may no longer be ignored by companies 
in the international trade supply chain—to do so exposes such businesses to 
potential civil and criminal liability. Consequently, what TBML is, how to 
spot it, and how to prevent it, have become significant issues for both the 
public and private sectors. Although FATF’s Best Practices Paper calls for 
gathering more and better information to help identify “other measures that 
could be considered in combating illicit use of the trade system,”124 the 
FATF and others, in particular the five U.S. banking regulators,125 have 
already produced useful guidelines on reducing potential exposure to 
TBML.
A. The Definition of Trade-Based Money Laundering 
The June 2006 TBML Report defines trade-based money launder-
ing as the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value 
through use of trade transactions to legitimize their illicit origins.126 This 
can be achieved through a variety of methods, including misrepresentation 
of the price, quantity, or quality of imports or exports, or by tax and/or cus-
toms fraud. The methods employed vary in complexity, and often misrepre-
123 Financial Action Task Force, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering An-
nexes 2003–2004, at 3 (2004), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/32/31/3539 
6215.pdf.
124 Best Practices Paper, supra note 7, at 1, 5–7 
125 See Appendix F, p. F-5, of the U.S. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION 
COUNCIL BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 2007 [he-
reinafter EXAMINATION MANUAL], available at http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/docu
ments/BSA_AML_Man_2007.pdf 
126 Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 3. 
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sentative or fraudulent documents will be a component of the scheme to 
launder the proceeds of criminal activity.127
Activities related to trade finance, primarily activities of banks in 
financing international trade, are a subset of TBML methods. These activi-
ties include issuing and confirming letters of credit for exports and imports 
and making loans to companies for the export or import of goods, as well as 
providing guarantees or stand-by letters of credit and pre-export financing, 
assisting companies in the collections process, discounting drafts and accep-
tances, and offering fee-based services such as credit and country informa-
tion on buyers.128
B. Red Flags for Trade-Based Money Laundering  
How can firms recognize trade-based money laundering well 
enough to form suspicions worth reporting? U.S. banking regulators and the 
FATF offer some clues: 
(1) Items shipped that are inconsistent with the nature of the customer’s 
business (e.g., a steel company that starts dealing in paper products, or an 
information technology company suddenly dealing in bulk pharmaceuti-
cals);129
(2) Customers conducting business in high-risk jurisdictions;130
(3) Customers shipping items through high-risk jurisdictions, including 
transit through non-cooperative countries;131
(4) Customers involved in potentially high-risk activities, including those 
subject to export/import restrictions (e.g., equipment for military or police 
organizations of foreign governments, weapons, ammunition, chemical 
mixtures, classified defense articles, sensitive technical data, nuclear mate-
rials, precious gems, or certain natural resources such as metals, ore and 
crude oil);132
(5) Obvious over- or under-pricing of goods and services;133
(6) Obvious misrepresentation of quantity or type of goods imported or 
exported;134
127 Id. at 3–4. 
128 See EXAMINATION MANUAL 241. See also The Wolfsberg Group, The Wolfsberg Trade 
Finance Principles (Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com. 
129 Id. at F-5. 
130 Id.
131 The non-cooperative countries list is currently a null set. See Annual Review of Non-
Cooperative Countries and Territories 2006–2007: Eighth NCCT Review, supra note 73, at 
2, 14. 
132 EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 125, at F-5.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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(7) A transaction structure that appears unnecessarily complex and de-
signed to obscure the transaction’s true nature;135
(8) A shipment that does not make economic sense (e.g., the use of a 40-
foot container to transport a small amount of relatively low-value 
goods);136
(9) Shipment size that appears inconsistent with the scale of the exporter 
or importer’s regular business activities;137
(10) A type of commodity being shipped that appears inconsistent with 
the exporter or importer’s regular business activities;138
(11) A transaction that involves receipt of cash or payment of proceeds 
(or other payments) from third-party entities that have no apparent connec-
tion with the transaction;139
(12) A transaction that involves front (or shell) companies;140
(13) Shipment locations or description of goods that are not consistent 
with the letter of credit; 
(14) Documentation showing a higher or lower value or cost of merchan-
dise than that which was declared to customs or paid by the importer;141
(15) Letters of credit that are amended significantly without reasonable 
justification or that include changes to the beneficiary or location of pay-
ment;142
(16) Significant discrepancies between the description of the commodity 
on the bill of lading and the invoice;143
(17) Significant discrepancies between the actual goods shipped and the 
descriptions of the goods on the bill of lading and/or invoice;144
(18) A transaction that involves the use of repeatedly amended or fre-
quently extended letters of credit;145 and 
135 Id.





141 EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 125, at F-5.
142 In order to satisfy the requirements of U.S. law, any changes in the names of parties 
should prompt an additional Office of Foreign Assets Control review. See 31 CFR pt. 103 
(2008).
143 Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 24. 
144 Id.
145 Id.
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(19) A transaction that involves commodities designated as “high risk” 
for money laundering activities, such as goods that present valuation prob-
lems or high value, high turnover consumer goods.146
C. Implications for Financial Institutions, Exporters, Importers, and 
Other Traders 
Why shouldn’t financial institutions, banks in particular, do all the 
heavy lifting, as the 40+9 Recommendations generally require? The answer 
is clear: it just would not work. Even a cursory examination of the red flags 
set forth above reveals exactly how unworkable it would be to assign banks 
the primary role for this purpose. At least half of the red flags require signif-
icantly more than the documentary review required of banks to uncover 
suspicious or unusual TBML-related activities or transactions. Red flags 
one, five, six, eight, nine, thirteen, fourteen, seventeen and eighteen would 
require active monitoring by a party involved in the exportation, importation 
or transport of goods in order to determine that something was not right.147
Additionally, up to eighty percent of international trade takes place under 
so-called open account transactions between buyers and sellers, which gen-
erally provide the financial institution with little or no information regarding 
the amount of the transaction, even omitting the identities of those from 
whom and to whom the money is being transferred in many instances.148
This further limits the effectiveness of financial institutions in preventing 
TBML.
Even if a bank or other financial institution were to be involved in 
the transaction, it is often difficult to determine whether a transaction is 
unusual or suspicious. For example, red flag five refers to obvious over- or 
under-pricing of goods.149 How is a bank to know what the correct price of 
goods being exported or imported should be?150 Similarly, red flag seven-
146 Id.
147 That these suspicions are best raised and confirmed by the traders themselves is but-
tressed by the fact that the currently existing legal liability for actions such as simple fraudu-
lent invoicing falls on the traders, not their financiers. See generally, Customs and Border 
Protection, Mitigation Guidelines: Fines, Penalties, Forfeitures and Liquidated Damages
(Feb. 2004). 
148 The Wolfsberg Group, The Wolfsberg Trade Finance Principles 1 (Jan. 14, 2009), 
available at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com. 
149 EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 125, at F-5.
150 For more on abnormal pricing in international trade, readers are referred to the work of 
Professors Simon Pak and John Zdanowicz. Simon Pak, Stelios Zanakis & John Zdanowicz, 
Detecting Abnormal Pricing in International Trade: The Greece-USA Case, 33 INTERFACES
54 (March 2003); Maria de Boyrie, Simon Pak & John Zdanowicz, The Impact of Switzer-
land’s Money Laundering Law on Capital Flows Through Abnormal Pricing in International 
Trade (Ctr. for Int’l Bus. & Educ. Research Working Paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=268444.
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teen refers to significant discrepancies that appear between the description 
of the goods on the bill of lading and the actual goods shipped.151 Under this 
red flag, a bank would be required to make a visual check of the goods, 
which would be difficult—if not impossible—because, even from the load-
ing dock, how would a bank ever discover significant discrepancies, except 
by accident? 
Many of the red flags also rely upon reference to a company’s ordi-
nary course of business. For example, red flag one refers to items shipped 
that are inconsistent with the nature of the customer’s business,152 and red 
flag nine refers to shipment sizes that are inconsistent with the scale of the 
exporter or importer’s regular business.153 These indicators require a de-
tailed knowledge well beyond the typical pay-against-documents role of 
banks—to such a degree that it is unlikely a bank could develop sufficient 
facts to determine whether a shipment is suspicious. There might be cases in 
which this is obvious, but in most cases the items will either be mischaracte-
rized in the shipping documents or the bank will not have sufficient infor-
mation about the customer to know whether the product being shipped is 
inconsistent with normal business.  
D. Compliance Programs: Goals and Implementation 
A new Recommendation from the FATF designed to cover TBML 
along the lines of the 40+9 Recommendations should address a variety of 
non-state actors not previously addressed by the FATF.154 The new Rec-
ommendation would need to require governments to take a number of ac-
tions to ensure, among other things, that exporters and importers conduct 
customer due diligence,  keep records, and file suspicious transaction re-
ports, just as financial institutions and DNFBP currently are expected to do. 
Alternatively, should the new Recommendation follow the approach of the 
9 Special Recommendations, countries would be required to adopt detection 
mechanisms,155 enhanced scrutiny for trade transactions with incomplete or 
suspicious information,156 and other measures designed to ensure that the 
151 Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 24. 
152 EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 125, at F-5.
153 Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 24. 
154 See Forty Recommendations, supra note 18, at 2–6.  
155 Special Recommendation IX covers the detection of cross-border transportation of 
currency. 9 Special Recommendations, supra note 19, at 2.  
156 Special Recommendation VII covers the “enhanced scrutiny of and monitor for suspi-
cious activity funds transfers [that] do not contain complete originator information.” Id. 
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international trade system is not used to conceal or facilitate terrorist financ-
ing.157
Implementation in the U.S. might resemble the four pillars of AML 
programs under section 352 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
Act (USA PATRIOT Act): (1) internal policies, procedures, and controls; 
(2) designation of an AML compliance officer; (3) ongoing employee train-
ing; and (4) an independent audit function to test the AML program.158 Ad-
ditionally, filing of suspicious activity reports should be required as well, 
and, with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol’s Container Security Initia-
tive, suspicious activity reports in the trade arena would be made available 
to law enforcement agencies, including the CBP, enhancing their ability to 
conduct targeted screening of incoming containers and to detect illicit trade 
transactions.159
1. Reducing criminal liability 
First issued in 1987, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing 
Guidelines) provide Federal judges with a tool to set criminal sentences for 
those convicted of violations of Federal law.160 The Sentencing Guidelines 
are designed to promote uniformity in sentencing under the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, which created the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion as an independent agency within the judicial branch.161 The Sentencing 
Guidelines are also employed by Federal prosecutors in settlement negotia-
tions with criminal defendants. 
In order to promote uniformity in sentencing, the Guidelines pro-
vide a formula for determining criminal penalties which includes “base le-
vels,”and aggravating and mitigating factors. First, the base level is deter-
157 Special Recommendation VII, for example, discusses including accurate and meaning-
ful originator information. Id
158 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub, L. No. 107-57, § 352, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2001)). 
159 CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE, supra note 16, at 20–21.  At the time of publication, 
much of the container security initiatives applicable to importers and exporters are voluntary 
measures as the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) focuses on generating the technology 
and methods needed to effectively screen the millions of containers coming into the U.S. See
id. It is, however, safe to assume that once appropriately unobtrusive methods are developed, 
container security initiative measures likely will become mandatory. The more this effort is 
coordinated internationally, the more quickly these voluntary measures may become interna-
tional standards. 
160 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2008). 
161 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (2008). 
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mined,162 followed by the various aggravating and/or mitigating factors,163
in order to determine a number that corresponds to a range of months in 
prison for an individual or a dollar amount in fines for an organization.
Organizations are vicariously liable for the criminal activities of 
their agents,164 but only the individuals who committed the crimes face jail 
time.165 Organizations, on the other hand, may face restitution demands, 
disgorgement, fines and probation, and an organization found to be operat-
ing for a criminal purpose could be ordered to divest all of its assets by 
fine.166
Chapter Eight of the Sentencing Guidelines deals with the sentenc-
ing of organizations and suggests methods by which an organization may 
reduce and even potentially eliminate liability for crimes committed by its 
agents through measures designed to reduce the organization’s culpabili-
ty.167 Under the Guidelines, culpability can be reduced in two ways. The 
first and most important way by which an organization may reduce its cul-
pability is to institute and maintain what the Guidelines call an “effective 
compliance and ethics program;”168 the second way is by self-reporting ac-
tual or potential crimes and fully cooperating with prosecutors in any subse-
quent investigation.169
a.  Crafting an effective compliance and ethics program 
An “effective ethics and compliance program” requires that any 
such program be reasonably designed, implemented and enforced in order to 
prevent and detect criminal conduct.170 The program should be aimed at 
promoting “due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct,” and 
162 Under the Guidelines, the base level for money laundering is eight, plus an increase 
depending on the amount of money involved—ranging from no increase for offenses involv-
ing under $5,000 to an increase of fourteen for an offense involving up to $1,000,000. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2S1.1(a)(2), 2B1.1 (2008). The level eight corresponds 
to a range of zero to twenty-four months in prison, depending on criminal history, and a level 
of twenty-two corresponds to a range of 41–105 months in prison. Id. at ch.5, pt. A, table. 
163 Mitigating Factors are called “downward departures” in the Guidelines, and include age, 
physical condition, criminal history, accepting  of responsibility, and aiding the authorities. 
Id. § 5G1.3(E), 5H1.1, 5H1.4, 5K2.0 cmt. background (2008). 
164 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). See also U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.8, introductory cmt. (2007). 
165 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.8, introductory cmt. (2008). 
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. § 8B2.1. 
169 Id. § 8C2.5(g).. 
170 Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2). 
110 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:85 
should “otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical 
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.”171
The Sentencing Guidelines instruct that “due diligence” and “com-
mitment to compliance” with legal and ethical standards require, at a mini-
mum:  
(1) Reasonable oversight by the board regarding content, implementation, 
operation, and “general[] effective[ness]” of the compliance and ethics 
program;172
(2) Ensuring the effective operation if the program by high-level manag-
ers;173
(3) The designation of at least one specific individual responsible for day-
to-day operational responsibility;174
(4) Reasonable efforts to ensure that those with substantial authority will 
comply with the program;175
(5) Continuing and periodic training;176
(6) Monitoring, auditing, periodic evaluations, internal reporting, and other 
“reasonable steps” to ensure effective operation;177
(7) Setting up appropriate incentives for compliance and disincentives for 
noncompliance;178 and 
(8) If criminal conduct is detected, making any necessary modifications to 
the program to ensure compliance in the future.179
In general, the elements required by a compliance program under 
the Guidelines parallel, and in some cases are virtually identical to, those 
found in the AML program requirements of the USA PATRIOT Act. For 
example, the requirement of “policies, procedures and internal controls” 
under section 352 of the PATRIOT Act corresponds with the Guidelines’ 
requirement for board oversight of the implementation and the effectiveness 
of the program,180 effective operation by high-level managers,181 incentives 
171 Id. § 8B2.1(a). 
172 Id. §§ 8B2.1(a)(1)–(2), 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) . 
173 Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B). 
174 Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C). 
175 Id. § 8B2.1(b)(3). 
176 Id. § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A). 
177 Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5). 
178 Id. § 8B2.1(b)(6). 
179 Id. §§ 8B2.1(b)(7), 8B2.1(c). 
180 See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(A) (2001); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 
8B2.1(a)(1)–(2), 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (2008). 
181 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B) (2008). 
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for compliance,182 and modification of the program if criminal conduct is 
detected.183 The requirement of the appointment of an AML compliance 
officer under section 352 184 is virtually identical to the Sentencing Guide-
lines recommendation for the designation of an individual with day-to-day 
responsibility.185 Similarly, the USA PATRIOT Act requirement regarding 
training186 is virtually identical to the Guidelines’ recommendation regard-
ing continuing and periodic training programs,187 and the PATRIOT Act 
independent AML audit requirement188 is encompassed within the Guide-
lines’ recommendation regarding auditing, periodic evaluations and internal 
reporting.189
Consequently, corporations adopting AML program requirements 
even when not required by law will go a long way toward mitigating poten-
tial criminal liability for TBML. The need for programs designed to miti-
gate criminal liability also will depend upon the likelihood of criminal con-
duct: “If, because of the nature of the organization’s business, there is a 
substantial risk that certain types of criminal conduct may occur, the organi-
zation shall take reasonable steps to prevent and detect that kind of criminal 
conduct.”190 With TBML now identified as one of the three major avenues 
of money laundering, businesses engaged in international trade must take 
notice of this risk associated with their business or face higher criminal pe-
nalties.
b.  Culpability score: reducing or increasing fines 
Similar to the way sentencing is determined for individuals, the 
Guidelines call for the determination of a base level fine, which is then re-
duced or increased depending upon the organization’s culpability, which is 
measured by a “culpability score.”191
The “culpability score” is a multiplier applied to amount of the 
fine.192 Starting with a multiplier of one, which corresponds to a culpability 
score of five, the Guidelines list considerations that increase or decrease an 
182 See id. § 8B2.1(b)(6) 
183 See id. §§ 8B2.1(b)(7), 8B2.1(c). 
184 See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(B) (2001). 
185 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (2008). 
186 See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(C) (2001). 
187 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A) (2008). 
188 See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(D) (2001). 
189 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(5) (2008). 
190 Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n.6. 
191 Id. § 8C2.5. 
192 Id. § 8C2.4 cmt. background. 
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organization’s culpability; this determines how large the fine will be.193
When high-level personnel involve themselves in the crime or establish a 
culture of tolerance for criminal activity, the culpability score increases.194
The score also increases if the organization has a prior history or has ob-
structed justice.195
If the organization had an “effective compliance and ethics pro-
gram” in place under its own initiative, as opposed to having such a pro-
gram in place because of a court order, then the culpability score decreases 
by three.196 Further, if an organization quickly reports a discovered offense 
prior to the threat of investigation, fully cooperates in the subsequent inves-
tigation, and “clearly demonstrate[s] recognition” of its responsibility, then 
the culpability score decreases by five.197
If the organization does not self-report, but still cooperates fully and 
clearly accepts responsibility, then the culpability score decreases by two.198
A clear acceptance of responsibility is worth a decrease of one.199
So, as an example, if the high-level personnel of an organization 
with 200–1,000 employees and with no prior history have engaged in crimi-
nal conduct, then the culpability score for the organization would be eight 
because three would be added for the involvement of high level personnel to 
the base of five. Further, under this example, the maximum recommended 
multiplier on the fine would be 3.2.200 If, however, the organization in ques-
tion had an effective compliance and ethics program, quickly self-reported, 
fully cooperated, and accepted responsibility, then the culpability score 
would be zero, and the corresponding maximum multiplier is a mere .2— 
meaning that the $175,000 fine would be reduced to only $35,000. 
c.  Further guidance on compliance from the Department of Justice 
The U.S. Department of Justice also has issued a memo on the lia-
bility of organizations entitled “Federal Prosecution of Business Organiza-
tions” (McNulty Memo).201 The McNulty Memo instructs prosecutors to 
consider the same factors listed in the Sentencing Guidelines in deciding 
193 Id. § 8C2.5. 
194 Id. § 8C2.5(b). Also, the larger an organization is, the more the score increases. See id.
195 Id. §§ 8C2.5(c)–(e). 
196 Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1). 
197 Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1). 
198 Id. § 8C2.5(g)(2). 
199 Id. § 8C2.5(g)(3). 
200 See id. § 8C2.6. 
201 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM REGARDING PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/sp 
eech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo]. 
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whether or not to prosecute an organization. Some of the considerations are 
the existence of a compliance program, prior history, timely disclosure, and 
management complicity.202
Although “the Department has no formal guidelines for corporate 
compliance programs,” in assessing the adequacy of the organization’s 
compliance program, the memo indicates that several factors should be tak-
en into consideration.203 These factors include the following: whether the 
program is well designed and comprehensive, and whether the program is 
part of normal business operations or is “merely a paper program;” the ex-
tent and pervasiveness of criminal conduct in the organization; the serious-
ness and duration of misconduct; the promptness of discovery and disclo-
sure; revisions to the compliance program to prevent future misconduct; the 
board’s independent oversight of corporate activity and whether the board 
receives sufficient information under the program to evaluate its decisions; 
and the sufficiency of internal auditing.204
The memo also instructs prosecutors to seek the expertise of other 
agencies in evaluating the compliance program, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services.205
As “[c]urrent and former U.S. Department of Justice officials have 
stated to the Advisory Group that the U.S. Department of Justice has de-
clined prosecutions based on the existence of an effective compliance pro-
gram,” making sure that the organization designs, implements, and main-
tains a sound compliance program can significantly reduce the organiza-
tion’s exposure to criminal liability.206
d.  Additional considerations on reducing culpability: FATF best prac-
tices
The FATF’s Best Practices Paper supports the extension by coun-
tries of existing AML/CFT strategies to combat TBML, such as: 
(1) training of law enforcement officials, customs officials, bank examin-
ers and the private sector;207
(2) “disseminat[ing] TBML typologies, red flag indicators and sanitised 
case studies” as part of any training;208
202 Id. at 4. 
203 Id. at 14. 
204 Id.
205 Id. at 15.  
206 Paul E. McGreal, Legal Risk Assessment After the Amended Sentencing Guidelines: The 
Challenge for Small Organizations, 23 CORP. COUNS. REV. 153 (2004). 
207 Best Practices Paper, supra note 7, at 2. 
208 Id. at 5. 
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(3) conducting further study of the issue at the national and regional le-
vels;209
(4) cooperating with intelligence gathering and investigations at the inter-
national level;210
(5) enhancing domestic information sharing among government agencies 
and ministries by developing “a domestic mechanism to link the work of 
authorities responsible for collecting, analysing and storing trade data with 
authorities responsible for investigating money laundering and terrorist fi-
nancing” with appropriate safeguards for the protection of privacy;211
(6) creating a “Trade Transparency Unit,” akin to a Financial Intelligence 
Unit, in order to collect, analyze and share trade data;212 and, 
(7) implementing the measures outlined above “with a view to ensuring 
that legitimate trading activities are not unreasonably hindered or ob-
structed.”213
What stands out most clearly in the Best Practices Paper is the em-
phasis on the need for more and better information regarding trade patterns 
before imposing any burdens on states, financial institutions, or other pri-
vate sector actors. “Since [TBML] has received relatively little attention 
from policy makers to date,”214 the “objective of [the] paper is to improve 
the ability of competent authorities to collect and effectively utilize trade 
data.”215
It is also clear, however, that the FATF is not ready to adopt signifi-
cant measures to require states, financial institutions, DNFBPs or traders 
and others in the supply chain to take action on TBML. After noting that 
“there is a need . . . for competent authorities to enhance their ability to 
identify TBML/FT techniques,” the FATF suggests that “countries could 
agree to incorporate TBML/FT into existing training programs on 
AML/CFT.”216
To that end, the FATF has provided various techniques for coun-
tries to analyze trade data to spot TBML trends that may be useful for com-
panies in designing anti-TBML procedures, including the following: 
(1) comparing domestic and foreign import and export documentation, 
prices, and other data; 
209 Id.
210 See id. at 7. 
211 See id. at 5. 
212 See id. at 8. 
213 Id. at 7. 
214 Id. at 1. 
215 Id. at 5. 
216 Id. at 2. 
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(2) identifying parties to each transaction; 
(3) checking transactions for known irregularities or risk indicators, such 
as origins, routes, and parties; 
(4) comparing import/export information with tax declarations; and  
(5) taking follow-up actions when anomalies or red flags appear in order to 
ensure the integrity of the transaction.217
2.  Reducing civil liability: In re Caremark and the duty to monitor 
By crafting a program to mitigate or avoid criminal liability for 
TBML, organizations may also act to reduce civil liability. For example, 
under Delaware law, an organization leaves itself exposed to civil liability if 
it does not implement and maintain compliance programs suited to the na-
ture of the organization and its line of business.218 The McNulty Memo spe-
cifically states that it is beneficial for organizations outside of Delaware to 
also follow the precedent set in In re Caremark (Caremark).219
In Caremark, shareholders filed a derivative suit against Caremark 
International Incorporated for criminal liabilities associated with referral 
payments prohibited under the Anti-Referral Payments Law and related 
Department of Health and Human Services regulations.220 After noting that 
Section 141 of Delaware General Corporation Law requires that the board 
of directors receive timely information in order to satisfy its duty to monitor 
corporate activities, Chancellor Allen emphasized the importance of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, writing that “[a]ny rational person attempting in 
good faith to meet an organizational governance responsibility would be 
bound to take into account this development and the enhanced penalties and 
the opportunities for reduced sanctions that it offers.”221 He continued by 
stating that the board must “assur[e] themselves that information and report-
ing systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide 
to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information 
sufficient to allow” informed business judgments.222
Thus, a failure to implement a compliance program reasonably de-
signed to deliver accurate information in a timely fashion exposes the board 
217 Id. at 3. 
218 See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding that directors must inform 
themselves about corporate affairs by establishing compliance systems in order to invoke 
protection under the business judgment rule). 
219 McNulty Memo, supra note 201, at 14. 
220 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961–62. 
221 Id. at 970. 
222 Id.
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and the organization to civil liability as well as criminal liability.223 As 
stated in a subsequent case, “Caremark and its progeny have held that direc-
tors can be held culpable in the monitoring context if they breach their duty 
of loyalty by ‘a sustained or systemic failure . . . to exercise oversight,’ or 
‘were conscious of the fact that they were not doing their jobs [as moni-
tors].’”224
In Caremark, Chancellor Allen considered that, despite Caremark’s 
criminal liability and $250,000,000 settlement, Caremark’s compliance pro-
gram met the fiduciary obligations of the board.225 Because Caremark and 
its predecessor had issued and periodically updated its guidelines for em-
ployee compliance, had conducted ongoing training, had an internal audit-
ing system, had hired an external company to conduct an independent ex-
ternal audit, and had engaged in a process of increasing management super-
vision and in-house contract review, Caremark avoided civil liability in ad-
dition to the criminal penalties it incurred.226 This decision was affirmed 
again in September 2008, when the Delaware Chancery held that “[w]here, 
as here, the board employed a special committee that met frequently, hired 
reputable advisors, and met frequently itself, a Caremark-based liability 
theory is untenable.”227
V. CONCLUSION
Although AML/CFT measures have succeeded in restricting the 
two traditional avenues of money laundering, namely, the abuse of financial 
intermediaries and the physical movement of money across borders, crimi-
nals and terrorist organizations have turned to TBML to conceal and legi-
223 See id. (“[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that 
a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, 
and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director 
liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.”). 
224 In re Lear Corp. Shareholder Litigation, Cons. C.A. No. 2728-VCS 24 (Del. Ch. Sept. 2, 
2008).
225 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971–72 (recognizing that a violation of criminal law does 
not necessarily trigger a breach of corporate fiduciary duty). 
226 Id. at 962–64. A 2006 Delaware Supreme Court decision affirmed the holding of Care-
mark and clarified that civil liability will not attach unless “(a) the directors utterly failed to 
implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such 
a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling 
themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.” Stone v. 
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).  
227 Lear Corp. Shareholder Litigation, Cons. C.A. No. 2728-VCS at 26 accord Stone, 911 
A.2d at syllabus (holding that “necessary conditions predicate for director oversight liability 
[include] utterly failing to implement any reporting or information system or controls, or 
consciously failing to monitor or oversee operations of such a system.”). 
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timize their funds, as this is a channel that remains relatively untouched by 
AML/CFT efforts internationally. This abuse of the global trade network 
has received increasing recognition from the FATF, the international stan-
dard setter, as the next front in AML/CFT. Because TBML methods may be 
used not only to launder money, but also to finance international terrorism, 
to facilitate weapons proliferation, and to conceal and transport WMDs and 
the materials used to make them, those in the international supply chain 
must find ways to safeguard their businesses. 
Given these considerations, companies involved in the international 
trade supply chain should design, implement, and maintain a program to 
detect and prevent TBML. Such a compliance program should be able to 
detect and report transactions that involve, at a minimum, any of the red 
flags228 and incorporate the guidance provided by the FATF and the U.S. 
Government.229 The program should include internal policies and proce-
dures approved by the Board of Directors and senior management that pro-
vide for the identification of customers and other parties to a trade transac-
tion, record keeping and the filing of suspicious transaction reports (in the 
U.S., suspicious activity reports or SARs); the designation of an AML/CFT 
compliance officer; ongoing training; and an independent AML/CFT audit.  
A central concern should be identifying and monitoring transactions 
out of the ordinary course of business, including those with frequent or nu-
merous alterations to documents such as letters of credit and bills of lading. 
A compliance program should also be able to detect the involvement of 
other parties to the transaction, those who may benefit by it, and shell com-
panies. Finally, large organizations heavily involved in international trade 
should ensure that all who are parties to the transaction, as well as those in 
the supply chain with respect to a particular transaction, be subject to some 
level of due diligence, depending on their role and relevant risk parameters 
such as geographic location, nature of the goods and services, and com-
plexity and size of the transaction.  
The risks are increasing as containers enter our countries without 
being inspected, as predicate crimes230 such as narcotics trafficking, human 
trafficking, and terrorist financing are committed across borders, and as 
logistical support for terrorist activities such as the movement of weapons of 
mass destruction is disguised or concealed in international trade.231 There is 
228 See supra Part IV.B.  
229 See supra Part IV.D. 
230 Under U.S. law, the underlying crimes to the offense of money laundering are called 
“specified unlawful activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2000). 
231 See generally Herbert V. Morais, Fighting International Crime and Its Financing: The 
Importance of Following A Coherent Strategy Based on the Rule of Law, 50 VILL. L. REV.
583 (2005) (providing an analysis of the connection between the fight against money laun-
dering and the expanding definition of international crime). 
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every expectation that the FATF, with its renewed mandate, will continue to 
take action on TBML; for now, all that remains uncertain is whether the 
FATF will add a 41st Recommendation to its current 40 Recommenda-
tions,232 a Special Recommendation X to its current 9 Special Recommen-
dations, or take some other course of action that has a less concerted effect 
on international trade.233 In whatever approach the FATF takes, to be effec-
tive, it should encompass not only the financial institutions and DNFBP 
addressed in the past, but also all those identified by the FATF in its Best 
Practices Paper, including importers, exporters, freight forwarders, shippers 
and air couriers.234
Because most multinational companies would fit squarely within 
this scope, non-financial companies that may not now be paying close atten-
tion to the 40+9 Recommendations would be significantly impacted. Given 
the global nature of money laundering and terrorist financing, and the con-
vergence of national AML/CFT laws with the FATF 40+9 Recommenda-
tions, companies may ignore their TBML risk only at their peril, potentially 
incurring both civil and criminal liability. Without developing customer 
identification procedures and other safeguards commensurate to the risk that 
TBML poses, a company makes itself vulnerable to aiding, whether inten-
tionally or not, a transnational criminal or terrorist organization in need of 
moving wealth, weapons, or chemical, biological, or nuclear materials 
across borders. Not only does this pose significant reputational risks, but, 
with the increasing attention being paid to TBML in the fight against inter-
national terrorism, the legal risks associated with failing to safeguard 
against TBML can no longer be ignored by non-financial businesses operat-
ing in the international trade supply chain. 
232 Forty Recommendations, supra note 18. 
233 9 Special Recommendations, supra note 19. 
234 Best Practices Paper, supra note 7, at 2 (“The term trader refers to anyone who facili-
tates the exchange of goods and related services across national borders, international boun-
daries or territories. This would also include a corporation or other business unit organised 
[sic] and operated principally for the purpose of importing or exporting goods and services 
(e.g. import/export companies).”).  
